From Idea to Policy: Scandinavian Municipalities Translating Radicalization by Andersson Malmros, Robin
  
 
 
 
 
Robin Andersson Malmros: From Idea to Policy: Scandinavian Municipalities Translating 
Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
38 
From Idea to Policy: Scandinavian Municipalities Translating 
Radicalization 
 
Robin Andersson Malmrosa1  
aPhD Student, School of Public Administration/The Segerstedt Institute, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden 
 
Article History 
Received Feb 13, 2019 
Accepted Mar 7, 2019 
Published Mar 29, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
Keywords: Radicalization, Local Policymaking, Neo-institutional Theory 
 
Introduction  
 
Since being revitalized in the beginning of the 21st century as a way to conceptualize “what 
goes on before the bomb goes off” (Neumann, 2008, p. 4), radicalization has proven to be 
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Abstract 
Radicalization has emerged as a dominant idea for understanding processes that 
lead to extremist beliefs and behavior. As societal efforts to counter extremism 
have become increasingly decentralized, local policymakers are being confronted 
with the task of making sense of radicalization. Departing from neo-institutional 
theory, this paper explores how the idea of radicalization has been materialized in 
60 Scandinavian (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) municipal policies that share 
the explicit aim of countering extremism. Most research on how radicalization has 
been conceptualized in policy focuses on the international and national levels. 
Instead, this paper provides a first large number analysis of how radicalization has 
been understood at the local level. A content analysis of the policies highlights the 
different definitions, explanatory factors and theories, models and checklists 
utilized. Findings show the considerable variance between municipal translations 
of radicalization. In some cases, the processual properties usually attributed to 
radicalization are contested as radicalization is portrayed as a mere outcome. A 
total of 66 different explanatory factors for radicalization are noticed by the 
municipalities, transforming most forms of deviant social and cultural statuses, 
psychological conditions and ideological positions to possible explanatory factors. 
Although the municipalities to a certain degree utilize the same labels for popular 
theories, models and checklists, this paper demonstrates that the content varies as 
they are transferred between contexts. The paper explains how and why such local 
variance occurs and which institutional elements that constrains translations of 
radicalization. 
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“irresistible as a concept” (Coolsaet, 2015, p. 6) and led to an “upsurge of academic interest” 
(Kundnani, 2012, p. 7). Intertwined with increased societal efforts to counter extremism, the 
popularity of radicalization has grown and generated numerous theories and models that aim 
to explain the pathway to extremism (De Coensel, 2018). However, the substantial academic 
and political interest has had disadvantages. Closely related to the rise in popularity of 
radicalization, one substantial stream of criticism points toward the ambiguous use of 
radicalization (Borum, 2011; Neumann, 2013; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018; Sedgwick, 2010). 
Neumann and Kleinmann (2013) called radicalization “one of the great buzzwords of our 
time” (p. 360) and the meaning of radicalization is today “essentially contested . . . the term 
generates such debate about its actual meaning that no objective or neutral position is 
possible” (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall & Jarvis, 2015, p. 6). In a literature review, Schmid 
(2013) found 13 somewhat contradictory definitions of radicalization that led to the 
conclusion that “the popularity of the concept of ‘radicalisation’ stands in no direct 
relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism” (p. 4). 
Despite being a contested idea, the process toward ideological violence that radicalization 
implies underpins and has motivated the adoption of policies at all societal levels to counter or 
prevent violent extremism (CVE/PVE). The logic motivating such policymaking is apparent: 
If there is a pathway to extremism, it can be interrupted by applying measures that address the 
perceived root causes of radicalization.  
CVE policies have spread over the world and thus also to Scandinavia. Sweden got its 
first national action plan in 2011 (SE state document 2011/12:44), Norway in 2010 (Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 2010) and Denmark in 2009 (DK state document, 2009). A public policy 
can be described as an overall and intentionally chosen approach to a specific subject of 
relevance to the public administration (Smith & Lipsey, 1976). Policies are often statements 
of intent that offer definitions of objectives, propose measures for meeting the objectives and 
outline how organizations understand and make sense of the problem they are trying to 
address (Lowi, 1972; Wolman, 1981). In Scandinavia, the municipalities have been given 
considerable responsibility for CVE work. This is partly motivated by the highly 
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decentralized state structures in the Scandinavian countries (Sellers & Lidström, 2007). The 
municipalities are locally autonomous political jurisdictions serving under national law with 
operational responsibility for many welfare operations, including schools, social services and 
youth centers. But the delegation of responsibility is also an effect of a broader assumption 
that local actors are better positioned to discover and counter radicalization as they encounter 
the target groups in everyday work: 
 
Local municipalities, together with and supported by national governments, are 
key frontline defence against radicalisation and violent extremism . . . it is at the 
local level that prevention and early detection can be most effective. Frontline 
practitioners such as teachers, community police officers, youth and social 
workers play a key role in detecting radicalisation and preventing violent 
extremism (RAN, 2016a, p. 2) 
 
As a consequence of the focus on local involvement, one of the most extensive CVE efforts in 
Scandinavia has been to establish municipal CVE policies. Mappings show that 134 of 290 
Swedish municipalities and 63 of 98 Danish municipalities have developed CVE policies in 
only a couple of years, without any regulatory measures forcing them to (Andersson Malmros 
& Mattsson, 2017; Ramboll, 2018).  
In relation to this background, it is surprising that local policies have drawn so little 
attention among researchers interested in radicalization and the countering of violent 
extremism. Previous research focused primarily on how radicalization has been 
conceptualized in global and national policymaking (Hardy, 2018; Lindekilde, 2012; Schmid, 
2013). Vermuelen (2014), however, argued that understanding local CVE policies is 
“imperative. This constitutes the backbone of European policies against violent extremism 
and is highly understudied, with most research on counterterrorism focusing on the national 
level” (p. 288). Consequently, we know little about how radicalization is understood by those 
who are to make practice of it at the local level. 
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The aim of this paper is to address this gap by contributing with an analysis of how 
Scandinavian municipal CVE policies conceptualize radicalization and offer an explanation 
for why variances and similarities occur between the policies. The research questions posed 
are:  
 
• How do Scandinavian municipalities translate the idea of radicalization into 
policy? 
• How can variances and similarities in the translations be explained? 
 
To operationalize the questions, the analysis focused on (1) the definitions of 
radicalization, (2) explanatory factors for radicalization and (3) theories, models and 
checklists that explain radicalization. The data consist of 60 Scandinavian municipal CVE 
policies (Denmark, n = 20; Norway, n = 20; and Sweden, n = 20) that are explored by 
applying a content analysis of the manifested and latent content of the policies. The findings 
are interpreted through the notions of translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) and editing 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), which have emerged as prominent analytical tools in neo-
institutional theory for understanding how and why organizations, despite being confronted 
with the same idea (radicalization), translate it differently in policy. 
Findings show considerable variance in conceptualizations of radicalization. 
Definitions fluctuate regarding whether the outcome of a radicalization process is solely 
cognitive or includes behavioral elements. In some cases, radicalization is conceived as the 
outcome itself and not the process to extremism. However, the variances are most notably 
represented by the 66 different explanatory factors accounted for in the policies. Almost any 
form of deviant individual behavior, social status and attitude can be translated into a potential 
root cause or indicator of radicalization. Although municipalities to some degree utilize the 
same labels for popular theories, models and checklists, the content of these varies as they are 
transferred between contexts.  
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The outline of the paper is as follows. First, the theoretical framework is introduced. 
Then, the paper’s methods, data and coding scheme are discussed. In the following section, 
the findings are presented nation by nation for a comparative analysis between the 
Scandinavian countries. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings in relation to 
neo-institutional theory and previous research on radicalization. Based on the findings, 
suggestions for future research and policymaking are provided. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
A central theme in neo-institutional theory has been to explain organizational behavior in 
relation to its environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & 
Salanick, 2003; Selznick, 1948). As an organization is socially embedded in its surroundings, 
it is affected by the rules, ideas and norms found within the institutional order in which the 
organization acts (Scott, 1995). Under institutional pressure and to remain legitimate, 
organizations change their forms and behaviors in relation to the symbols and myths 
considered to be appropriate by the organization’s environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As a 
consequence of the adoption of the same rationalized myths, organizations involved in 
producing and distributing the same type of services (e.g., CVE work) increasingly become 
more similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
But as previous studies on terrorism and CVE work have demonstrated, although 
focused on the same or similar issues, the outcomes in policy seems to be somewhat different 
(Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017; Hardy, 2018; Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). For 
example, Van Heelsum and Vermeulen (2017) noted in their study of CVE policies in four 
European cities that “even if national policies gave direction, cities interpreted them in their 
own ways” (p. 169), indicating that local actors pick out the content that they find most fitting 
in relation to their local context, identity and objectives. A well-known way of understanding 
such change and variance is through the sociologic translation model (Czarniawska & 
Joerges, 1996). According to the translation model, socially constructed ideas such as 
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radicalization are translated rather than diffused when traveling from one space and time to 
another. This argument draws on Latour and Woolgar’s  (1986) suggestion that ideas are not 
transmitted in a vacuum without human interference, thus we can expect variance as policies 
travel between contexts. The translation chain can be portrayed as involving four phases 
(inspired by Erlingsdottir & Lindberg, 2005): (1) For an idea to travel across an organizational 
field, or from one field to another, the idea must first be dis-embedded from its institutional 
environment, translated and packaged as a materialized object, such as a picture, PowerPoint 
presentation, prototype, template or as in the case of this paper, a policy plan. The 
objectification of an idea is important because “only a thing can be moved from one place to 
another and from one point in time to another” (Czarniawska, 2009, p. 425). The idea then is 
able to travel from one local time and space to another until the idea finds an organization that 
finds it attractive. (2) The materialized idea is then unpacked and translated to fit the new 
context and finally, re-embedded (implemented) to form new practices (Czarniawska & 
Sevón, 2005). Once moved, the idea cannot remain unchanged: “to set something in a new 
place is to construct it anew” (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 8). If these practices are 
repeated over and over again until they are taken for granted, (3) they become an institution 
and (4) can be abstracted and dis-embedded to be sent away through time and space again.  
Therefore, we can expect the materialized idea of radicalization to be reformulated and 
recontextualized, edited, as it moves between contexts and settings (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017). 
Editing provides a detailed micro-level analysis of the translation process, in which new 
properties are subscribed, or old ones removed, potentially changing the meaning and the 
content of the original model. The editing process is according to Sahlin-Andersson (1996) 
influenced by social editing rules that restrict and direct how accounts are given. The first set 
of rules concerns the context. As an object (e.g., a radicalization model) is applied in a new 
organizational setting, the specific time- and space-bound features of the original setting are 
downplayed or omitted. Consequently, a decontextualized, abstracted and generalized account 
of the original model is translated and implemented (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). The second set 
of rules concerns the logic and how effects of models are retrospectively rationalized to fit a 
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causal problem-solving ideal. The (positive) effects of an activity are portrayed as the result of 
identifiable and planned activities. Contradicting (negative) results, other possible 
explanations or results that are deranged from an unplanned or uncontrollable activity are 
neglected, erased or omitted (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). The third set of rules concerns 
formulation which highlights how objects are formulated and reformulated to fit current 
agendas, often by applying dramatic terms and labels that are easy to talk about, associate 
with and remember. Stories are created about a successful model or development, which are 
circulated and further edited by ascribing new or emphasizing certain elements as they travel 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Objects may be packaged and repackaged, and as “even small 
reformulations . . . may fundamentally change its meaning or focus” (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017, 
p. 110), such processes are of interest when analyzing the content of CVE policies. 
 
Methods 
 
To answer the question of how the idea of radicalization has been translated to policy, data 
were retrieved from 60 municipal CVE policies (Denmark, n = 20, Norway, n = 20; and 
Sweden, n = 20) that share the outspoken objective of countering violent extremism. A 
presentation of the policies included in the material can be found in appendix 1. In cases 
where excerpts from the policies are utilized as examples in the findings, the full reference is 
provided in the reference list. All excerpts were linguistically translated from their native 
language to English by the author. The data were collected between December 2017 and May 
2018 and the municipalities were strategically (Flyvberg, 2006) chosen based on two criteria. 
The first was the population size of the municipality which is motivated by the fact that the 
problem of radicalization, especially in relation to violent Islamism, has been manifested 
primarily in urban areas and in suburbs of larger cities in Scandinavia (Gustafsson & 
Ranstorp, 2017; Politiets Sikkerhetstjenstene, 2016). The second criterion was that a plan 
could be retrieved. In two cases, a separate file containing a CVE policy could not be found; 
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instead, content from a municipal webpage on CVE was downloaded and analyzed as the 
CVE policy.  
The content analysis drew on key principles found in Duriau, Reger, and Pharrer’s 
(2007) overview of the use of content analysis in management research. Content analysis is a 
class of methods “in the intersection of the qualitative and quantitative methods” (Duriau et 
al., 2007, p. 5), recognizing that the use of words and themes reflects the attention given by an 
organization to certain issues. The content analysis in this paper focused on two levels of the 
text. The first level is frequencies, where the categories proposed in the analytical framework 
below are analyzed to understand to what extent they are manifested in the policies. The 
second level is the latent content of the policies, where deeper context and meaning are 
analyzed which acquires more interpretation (Duriau et al., 2007). 
The CVE policies were added to NVivo and coded according to three categories: (1) 
definitions of radicalization, (2) explanatory factors for radicalization and (3) theories, models 
and checklists that explain radicalization. The main categories were then broken down into 
subcategories with the help of previous research on radicalization, but the data motivated the 
development of additional subcategories. This abductive research process, inspired by the 
framework provided by Dubois and Gadde (2002), follows Weick’s (1979) suggestion to 
“invest in theory to keep some intellectual control over the burgeoning set of case 
descriptions” (p. 38).  
The analysis of (1) the definitions of radicalization relies on the distinction between 
cognitive and behavioral radicalization (Neumann, 2013). The focus is on how the process of 
radicalization is described and with what outcome (or endpoint as Neumann, 2013, called it). 
In short, cognitive radicalization refers to the movement from moderate mainstream beliefs to 
extremist ones and thus, focuses on attitudes, values and beliefs. The outcome is radical or 
extremist beliefs. Behavioral radicalization focuses the question of how someone becomes an 
extremist (the action pathway). The endpoint according to this perspective is extremist 
actions. However, no policy had a pure behavioral definition of radicalization. Instead, the 
policies used definitions that either included a cognitive process with a cognitive outcome or a 
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cognitive process with a cognitive and behavioral outcome. Therefore, the relevant categories 
were cognitive and cognitive/behavioral. 
The analysis of (2) explanatory factors for radicalization focused on the accounts in 
the CVE policies concerning the factors that contribute to radicalization, often referred to as 
“root causes” in academic and public discourse. The subcategorization draws inspiration from 
the work of Hafez and Mullins (2015) whose synthesis suggested that radicalization research 
focuses on four different factors that “come together to produce violent radicalization” (p. 
958). Grievance focuses on macro-level processes and circumstances that might drive a 
person toward terrorism. Often-used examples are marginalization, stigmatization and 
discrimination. Networks refer to the ties between the individual and the meso-level milieu in 
which the socialization and diffusion of extremist ideas take place. The subcategory also 
captures arguments that propose involvement in extremist milieus as a response to the need to 
belong and meaningful relationships. Ideology includes accounts about the role of master 
narratives, political and religious, that explain how the world should look and justifies the use 
of violence to achieve change. Support systems focus on physical and virtual settings and 
milieus in which radicalization is facilitated, such as prisons, radical civil society 
organizations and the internet. Two additional subcategories were added during the coding 
process. Individual vulnerability focuses on micro-level factors, such as gender, age, mental 
status and experiences of trauma, that make individuals become at risk of being radicalized. In 
the original categorization by Hafez and Mullins (2015), factors such as personal crisis or 
losses fell under Grievances, but did not include factors related to age, sex and mental illness. 
Therefore, this subcategory was developed and expanded to broadly capture micro-factors 
related to vulnerability. The category Power and thrill was inspired by Atran’s (2010) notion 
that individuals engaging in terrorism are partly doing it because they are on a quest for 
adventure, glory and purpose for their lives. This type of explanatory factors occurred 
frequently in the CVE policies and was added as a sub-category. 
The analysis of (3) theories, models and checklists that explain radicalization includes 
coherent theories or models that aim to explain the path toward engagement in violent 
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extremism. In addition to theories and models, “checklists of radicalization” are highlighted 
as they provide practitioners with observational signs that are presented as possible indicators 
of an ongoing radicalization process. 
 
Findings 
 
Definitions: Radicalization, a process or an outcome? 
Nearly all Danish and Norwegian municipalities include a definition of radicalization 
in their CVE policies, while only one of four Swedish policies do (Denmark, n = 17; Norway, 
n = 20; and Sweden, n = 5). Overall, the definitions utilized in the policies portray 
radicalization as a cognitive process in which the acquisition of certain beliefs serves as a 
fundament of the radicalization process. Another general finding is that the definitions portray 
radicalization as an individual process, but important national differences can be found 
concerning this. Danish and Swedish municipalities to a higher degree include groups as a 
basic unit that might undergo radicalization processes.  
Nearly a third (n = 19) of the municipalities (Denmark, n = 7; Norway, n = 11; and 
Sweden, n = 1) uses definitions that indicate that a person only has to acquire certain ideas to 
be radicalized, making the process and the outcome solely cognitive. These definitions focus 
on the acceptance and (cognitive) support of violent or non-legal means to achieve political or 
religious goals and not the actual use of such means. Radicalization is understood as an “inner 
process, that under the right conditions, can bring a person in an increasing degree to accept 
use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals” (Drammen, 2015, p. 9). 
Norwegian municipalities primarily focus on acceptance of the use of violence as an outcome 
of cognitive radicalization, but Danish municipalities have a more inclusive point of view, 
often including acceptance of other forms of non-legal means (e.g., Copenhagen, 2016) and 
“undemocratic” (Lyngby-Taarbaek, 2016, p. 13) outcomes of the process.  
Furthermore, 23 CVE policies (Denmark, n = 10; Norway, n = 9; and Sweden, n = 4) 
include behavioral elements in the outcome of radicalization, most often in combination with 
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cognitive elements. Extremist beliefs are understood as a precondition for extremist behavior. 
In most policies, violence is the proposed outcome, but Danish policies diverge by ascribing 
affiliation with violent extremist organizations as a behavioral outcome of the radicalization 
process.  
 
 Denmark Norway Sweden Total 
 
Cognitive 
 
 
7 
 
11 
 
1 
 
19 
 
Cognitive/Behavioral 
 
 
10 
 
9 
 
4 
 
23 
Table 1: Type of definitions of radicalization 
 
Drawing on an official Swedish assessment of extremist threats (SE state document 
2014/15:144), two Swedish policies make an effort to display radicalization as a pure 
behavioral process with an expressed focus on criminal actions: 
 
To develop anti-democratic values or to hold extreme opinions do not fall, 
according to this definition, under the term radicalization . . . The radicalization 
process involves a phase where acceptance of violence is developed, but those 
who remain in this early phase or abort the radicalization process are, therefore, 
not to be considered radicalized . . . That which is criminal and so of interest of 
the police and therefore included in the definition of radicalization is exclusively 
the process that results in support for, or participation in, ideologically motivated 
criminality . . . Those who are affiliated with violence-approving extremism 
milieus have almost always gone through a radicalization process. (Gothenburg, 
2016, pp. 5–6)  
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Initially, the policy suggests that developing anti-democratic values or extreme opinions are 
not to be considered part of radicalization. However, in the following sentence the policy 
contends that the radicalization process involves cognitive non-criminal elements (acceptance 
of violence). Next, the account states that only processes whose outcomes are criminal 
behavior or support for such behaviors are to be understood as radicalization. This is 
contradictory as support for ideologically motivated criminality might be considered an 
extreme opinion and thus would not, according to the first sentence, be understood as 
radicalization. Interestingly, the account also distinguishes among radicalization, 
radicalization process and radicalized. Radicalization is portrayed as an outcome with certain 
manifestations, radicalization process the road to that outcome and radicalized a particular 
social status. Finally, the account leaves an open space for extremism to be an outcome of 
something other than a radicalization process, without suggesting an alternative or further 
elaboration. If a municipality’s objective is to counter radicalization, utilizing this definition 
would make such work difficult as the term only would be able to apply in retrospect: once 
you know if someone has “gone all the way” into violent extremism.  
However, the struggle to make sense of radicalization is not limited to Sweden. The 
Norwegian municipality of Ski (2016) states that “radicalization is defined as to dissociate 
oneself from society’s democratic principles and at the same time justify use of threats and 
violence to reach its goals” (p. 3), while arguing later in the same section that “radicalization 
takes place when thoughts become actions” (p. 4). Thus, radicalization is understood as two 
outcomes that are hard to reconcile with each other: Is radicalization a divergent political 
position (cognitive outcome) or when the same thoughts result in actions (behavioral 
outcome)?  
Focusing on cognitive outcomes is far from unproblematic in countries with far-
reaching constitutional rights regarding freedom of speech, invoking the conflict between 
radical thoughts and radicalization as proposed by previous research (Heath-Kelly et al., 
2015; Kundnani, 2012). Horten (2016) provided an example of how this conflict is dealt with: 
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It is important to distinguish between radicalization and being radical. The term 
radical is used about what is revolutionary and far-reaching. Radical stances and 
actions can be used concerning politics, religion, ethics, art and culture and so on. 
It is not illegal to be radical. The term is often used in a positive manner. Large 
changes in society has been completed thanks to radical persons who have pushed 
for a matter or change. Radicalization, on the other hand, displays a process where 
a person or group in a gradual degree accepts the use of violence as a means to 
reach political, ideological or religious goals. (Horten, 2016, p. 4) 
 
In this case, radical is formulated as a positive, legal and static position, while radicalization is 
portrayed as a negative process that ends with the acceptance of violence. The Danish 
municipality of Frederiksberg (2016) utilizes a different strategy to cope with the conflict by 
transforming radical points of view into an outcome of radicalization: “radicalization is 
defined as support for radical points of view or extremist ideology, on grave occasions 
accepting the use of violence or other non-legal means to achieve a political/religious goal” 
(p. 7). Such a formulation eliminates the possible boundary and divergent relationship 
between being radical and being radicalized. 
To sum up, radicalization is defined in fundamentally divergent ways. In addition to 
having different perspectives on the outcome of the process, the processual properties usually 
attributed to the idea are contested as radicalization is portrayed as a mere outcome in several 
policies. Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino and Caluya (2011) critically noted in a literature 
review of counter-extremism and radicalization that “the only thing that radicalization experts 
agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to 
make existing research incomparable” (p. 13). The analysis of CVE policies in this paper 
implies that this alleged common ground should not be taken for granted. 
When confronted with the problem of distinguishing between cognitive outcomes of 
radicalization (e.g., radical opinions) and the universal democratic principle of freedom of 
speech, I argue that the municipalities apply two editing strategies (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). 
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The first is editing by neglecting the existence of a conflict, either by not offering a definition 
of radicalization at all (e.g., 15 Swedish municipalities) or not elaborating on the problematic 
relationship between radicalization and radical opinions. Although apparent in relation to the 
encouragement for practitioners to detect so-called early concerns of radicalization regarding 
attitudes, political or religious ideas and rhetoric, few municipalities make an effort to 
problematize or discern what separates the process that leads to radical thoughts from one that 
leads to extremist violence. The second strategy is editing by downplaying the conflict. The 
municipalities utilizing this strategy recognize the conflict but downplay the problematic 
relationship through reformulation of the conflict. As presented in the findings, one way of 
doing this is “stripping” radical or radicalization from its processual properties by portraying 
one or the other as a static position or more commonly, simply including radical thoughts as 
outcome of the process.   
 
Explanatory factors for radicalization: everything or anything? 
Norwegian CVE policies make a considerably more extensive and inclusive effort to 
describe the explanatory factors for radicalization in comparison to Danish and Swedish ones. 
Of the 20 Norwegian policies analyzed, 17 of them mentions at least one factor, while 15 
point to three or more factors. Eleven Danish policies describe a minimum of one factor, 
while four describe three or more factors. In Sweden, 12 policies bring up at least one factor, 
and five account for three or more factors. 
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 Denmark Norway Sweden Total 
 
Grievance 
 
10  
 
17 
 
7  
 
34 
 
 
Major 
factors (≥ 3) 
 
 
 
 
Minor 
factors (< 3) 
 
Exclusion, failure to 
thrive, frustration, 
marginalization, social 
vulnerability 
 
 
Unemployment, 
reaction to conflicts 
and in-group exposure, 
poverty 
 
Exclusion, 
marginalization, 
racism, discrimination, 
reaction to conflicts 
and in-group exposure, 
poverty 
 
Dedication to refugee-
related questions, 
unemployment 
 
Exclusion, lack of belief 
in the future, lack of 
opportunities to engage 
in society, injustice 
 
 
Discrimination, reaction 
to conflicts and in-group 
exposure, stigmatization 
 
 
 
Ideology 
 
4  
 
 
7 
 
9  
 
20 
 
Factors (≥1) 
 
Brainwashing, Salafi-
militant Islamism, 
legitimizing violence 
 
Conspiracy theories, 
brainwashing, 
polarization tactic, 
guidance on how to 
live, legitimizing 
violence 
 
 
Provides answers to 
frustration, legitimizes 
violence, inspires “lone 
wolves”  
 
 
Individual 
vulnerabilit
y 
 
 
5 
 
13 
 
6  
 
24 
 
Factors (≥1) 
 
Psychological 
vulnerability, ADHD 
diagnosis, Asperger 
diagnosis, secondary 
traumatization, moral 
shock, trauma, youth, 
gender, social heritage, 
imprisonment 
 
 
Psychological pain, 
youth rioting, moral 
shock, conflict of 
identities, domestic 
violence, trauma, 
experiences of 
bullying and/or assault 
 
Youth, identity quest, 
gender, rapid personality 
changes, trauma, 
domestic problems, 
youth rioting 
 
 
Networks 
 
5  
 
13 
 
5  
 
23 
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Factors (≥1) 
 
Need to belong, 
extremism in family, 
support for beliefs and 
violence, promotes 
isolation, evolution of 
a brotherhood, in-
group pressure, cross-
over phenomenon 
 
 
Need for friendship, 
longing for safety and 
support, pressure from 
transnational family 
relations, need to be 
acknowledged, 
sheltering 
 
Socialization of beliefs, 
belonging to a 
fellowship, loyalty 
bonds, extremism in 
family, need for 
friendship 
 
 
Power and 
Thrill 
 
1 
 
12 
 
- 
 
13 
 
 
Factors (≥1) 
 
Excitement, sense of 
adventure 
  
 
Excitement, wanting 
power, provoking 
  
 
Support 
Systems 
 
4  
 
16 
 
3  
 
23 
 
 
Factors (≥1) 
 
Internet propaganda, 
social media 
connections, prisons  
 
Criminal areas, 
internet propaganda, 
social media 
connections 
 
Internet propaganda, 
discussions in web 
forums 
 
Table 2: Explanatory factors for radicalization 
 
Overall, grievance is the subcategory considered by most Scandinavian municipalities 
as explaining radicalization (Denmark, n = 10; Norway, n = 17; and Sweden, n = 7). A wide 
range of factors are described as contributing to radicalization, but frustration as a result of 
being marginalized, of being excluded, of not having opportunities to thrive and conflicts 
(domestic and international) is among the most frequently mentioned factors in all countries. 
The focus on grievance in the CVE policies points to circumstances that exist outside the 
individual, bringing society and politics into the radicalization process as factors: “In a society 
where individuals experience polarization, exclusion, low possibility to influence and low 
belief in the future increases the risk of emergence of destructive milieus and violent 
affirmative extremism” (Gothenburg, 2016, p. 9). Copenhagen’s (2016) policy argues that a 
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consistent feature among individuals at risk of radicalization is that they “feel excluded from 
the community to such a high degree that they develop resistance to the society in which they 
grew up” (p. 6). Grievances are described as having a direct causal relation to radicalization 
processes (e.g., Esbjerg, 2016), as well as serving as a basic foundation for different negative 
outcomes, with radicalization one of them (Lund, 2016; Ringkoping-Skjern, 2017). In 
Norway, more focus is on conflicts, both national and international. Racism and 
discrimination in society are seen as important factors that might drive a person toward 
radicalization. In line with such arguments, a number of municipalities explicitly recognize 
national political conflicts concerning immigration and refugees as important factors for 
radicalization. International conflicts might also contribute as becoming a violent extremist 
for some can be a reaction to war (Baerum & Asker, 2015) or a reflection of the wish to “help 
one of the parties in a conflict” (Fredrikstad, 2017, p. 1).   
Ideology (Denmark, n = 4; Norway, n = 7; and Sweden, n = 9) is given the most 
attention in Swedish CVE policies, but is stressed less in Denmark. Even if policies agree on 
ideology serving a role in legitimizing violence, the factor varies considerably between the 
countries. Swedish policies focus on the connection between ideology and so-called lone 
wolves, actors who perpetrate their actions seemingly alone and without sharing planning or 
execution of terror attacks with others (Gardell, Lööw, & Dahlberg-Grundberg, 2017). 
Norwegian municipalities pay attention to the role of conspiracy theories and the effect such 
theories have on the radicalization process. Danish municipalities, however, focus on militant 
Islamism and the mobilizing effect it can have among people in criminal networks, offering a 
way to contribute to a righteous cause and providing a narrative that the West is in a war with 
Islam. 
For the category individual vulnerability (Denmark, n = 5; Norway, n = 13; and 
Sweden, n = 6), the countries display similarities and differences. Age is the most common 
factor among the countries. Being young and in the process of becoming an adult is 
considered a risk factor for radicalization. In line with these arguments, radicalization is often 
portrayed as a form of youth rioting or revolt against the norms of family and society. The 
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Swedish municipality of Halmstad urges their professionals to ask themselves whether the 
identified risk behavior is a “call for attention, exclusion or a normal part of a teenage process 
which identity quests and fascination for sub-cultures are a part of” (Halmstad, 2017, p. 9). 
The municipality of Nacka (2016) in Sweden suggests that employees should have knowledge 
to identify suspicious milieus where extremism can “grow” and that indicators of such milieus 
are “homogeny youth milieus concerning gender, age, ethnicity, etc.” (Nacka, 2016, p. 3). 
What “etc.” means in this particular case is not specified later in the policy.  
Ethnicity, culture and identity struggles are factors that reoccur together. Several 
Norwegian municipalities refer to the “moral shock” that a refugee might experience coming 
to Norway. In Denmark, Herning (2017) is more explicit about the matter, proposing that the 
troublesome position of being between two cultures (Muslim and Danish) and the change 
from being in environments informed by traditional values to such where individual values 
are dominant, might be a root cause of radicalization. Psychological vulnerability is also 
presented as an important, but most often unspecified and unelaborated, factor. A few 
exceptions are found, however. Concerning individual psychological conditions, 
Frederiksberg (2016) points to an attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnosis 
and Asperger syndrome as relevant risk factors for radicalization. In addition to such specific 
diagnoses, attention is given to the role that trauma plays, both in terms of individual 
“wounds” and those that family members carry with them, so-called secondary traumatization 
(Frederiksberg, 2016). Traumas can include a death in the family (Herning, 2017), abuse and 
bullying (Ski, 2016; Stavanger, n.d.) and domestic violence (Oslo, 2018). 
The accounts regarding networks (Denmark, n = 5; Norway, n = 13; and Sweden, n = 
5) can be divided into two parts. One focuses on general social needs among human beings, 
while the other focuses on specific group- or network-oriented processes. The accounts 
supplement the former, describing radicalization as driven by the need to belong, status, 
acknowledgement and safety among mostly young, troublesome individuals. In segregated 
communities with a low degree of social cohesion and trust and the isolation of certain ethnic 
groups, such drivers become stronger (Helsingör, 2017). The same applies to problematic 
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family circumstances (Karlstad, 2016; Lund, 2016). The Norwegian municipality of Skien 
(2015) provides a telling example: “For some, the extreme groups are experienced as the only 
way to be seen and heard for your opinions . . . They can also experience that it gives status 
and power when the group they belong to frightens others” (p. 8). The specific group and 
network processes highlighted differ among the countries. Danish policies pay attention to the 
cross-over phenomenon - when gang members shift to violent Islamism groups (Copenhagen, 
2016; Frederiksberg, 2016), or when right-wing extremists change to Motorcycle gangs 
(Helsingör, 2017). The capability of using violence established in the previous violent milieu 
becomes a resource for the group and the individual when switching milieus (Herning, 2017). 
In addition to the possibility of exploiting the resources, cross-overs are simplified by family 
and childhood contacts between the milieus (Herning, 2017).  
Power and thrill (Denmark, n = 1; Norway, n = 12; and Sweden, n = 0) is a category 
given less space than the five others, especially in Denmark and Sweden. Although 12 of the 
Norwegian policies describe power and thrill as drivers for radicalization, no further 
elaboration of how these drivers affect the process is provided. 
Support systems (Denmark, n = 4; Norway, n = 16; and Sweden, n = 3) are mainly 
concerned with the role of the internet as a way of spreading propaganda (Eskilstuna, 2018), 
an arena where so-called online radicalization takes place (Aarhus, n.d.), a facilitator for 
social contacts (Copenhagen, 2016) and an arena for committing extremism-related crimes 
(Bergen, 2015). Norwegian municipalities have a high frequency of accounts, but they portray 
little variance. Oslo (2018) provides an additional comment on the role of the internet, but the 
others use the same phrase that differentiates extremism and radicalization in the “real world” 
from that on the web, by viewing online extremism as “radicalization and violent extremism 
on the internet” (Kristiansand, 2015, p. 6). The Danish and Swedish policies that acknowledge 
the role of the internet primarily focus on how extremist groups use the internet to spread 
propaganda and recruit new members.  
To sum up, although translating the same idea (radicalization), 66 different 
explanatory factors are conceived as potential root causes. Almost all forms of problematic or 
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deviant social, cultural, psychological and ideological “conditions” have been translated into a 
possible explanatory factor for radicalization, supporting notions on radicalization as a vague 
and ambiguous idea (Sedgwick, 2010) or more radically, “a container concept” (Coolsaet, 
2016, p. 37). However, one category is given considerably more attention than the others: 
grievances. As countering the macro-related factors included in this category is an established 
part of Scandinavian municipal work, these factors are easier to make sense of and tie existing 
practices to. To do this, the logic of the causal relationship between grievances and 
radicalization is edited to fit a causal problem-solving ideal. Radicalization becomes “an 
expression of miss-being, frustration and the feeling of not belonging” (Esbjerg, 2016, p. 3), 
making practices designed to prevent or allay consequences of grievances “translateable” to 
fit the new frame of countering radicalization. 
Another interesting finding is that radicalization is used without consideration of its 
contextual manifestations. Thus, the local context itself is not viewed as a root cause. No or 
little reflection (exceptions exist: e.g., Oslo, 2018, and Copenhagen, 2016) is given to whether 
radicalization is a problem within the municipality or what type of milieu (e.g., jihadi-
Salafism, right- or left-wing extremism) in which citizens are being radicalized. Thus, 
radicalization is decontextualized - edited by stripping it of the contextual properties, 
abstracted, stabilized and therefore made possible to fit any new context. Put differently, 
radicalization and its root causes are portrayed as something that is not dependent on where it 
happens or in what milieu. This decontextualization is a paradox in relation to the 
“radicalization is best dealt with locally” paradigm as local CVE work, arguably, should rest 
on a local analysis of the problem and not national or international mappings. The absence of 
contextualization also indicates that the explanatory factors for radicalization presented in the 
policies are not products of a rational deliberation process derived from local experiences, but 
according to institutional constraints in the organizational environment (the institutional 
constraints are further elaborated in the concluding discussion). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Robin Andersson Malmros: From Idea to Policy: Scandinavian Municipalities Translating 
Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
58 
Theories, models and checklists: same labels, different contents 
There are nation-specific and transnational ways to theorize and model the 
radicalization process. To begin with the former, the life psychology theory (Bertelsen, 2015) 
was picked up by three Danish municipalities. Norwegian CVE policies ( n = 5) are the only 
policies that use the radicalization tunnel model (Norwegian government, 2016), and two 
Swedish policies use an unnamed theory produced by the Swedish Security Police and the 
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2009), portraying four major pathways to 
extremism. This finding serves as the strongest evidence for the overall observation that 
national belonging serves as an institutional constraint in the translation process.    
However, internationally well-known theories and models are also used in the 
Scandinavian countries, including the push and pull factor model (Denmark, n = 1; Norway, n 
= 3; and Sweden, n = 2). This model includes two sets of factors. Some push individuals 
toward extremist milieus while other pull them in (RAN, 2016b). In general, the factors listed 
as push factors (ranging from seven to ten factors depending on the municipality) are found in 
the grievance and individual vulnerability explanatory boxes, while the pull factors (ranging 
from five to 13 factors) mainly concern the role of networks, ideology and power and thrill. In 
addition, the model is used with caution as nearly all municipalities state that the factors listed 
“are only examples of push and pull factors” (Helsingborg, 2016, p. 5). Local editing of the 
model is extensive, as none of the municipalities use the same push and pull factors in their 
CVE policies, but vary regarding which factors are enlisted and how many. For example, the 
municipality of Helsingborg (2016) in Sweden lists problematic and destructive home 
conditions as a relevant push factor, while Karlstad (2016) in the same country does not 
include that factor.  
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 Denmark Norway Sweden 
 
Theories, models and 
checklists 
 
Push and pull 
factors to 
extremism (n = 1) 
 
 
Risk and protective 
factors (n = 2) 
 
Life psychology 
theory (Aarhus 
model) (n = 3) 
 
Three-phase model 
(n = 3) 
 
List of concern 
signs and signals (n 
= 15) 
 
 
Push and pull 
factors to 
extremism (n = 3) 
 
 
Risk and protective 
factors (n = 12) 
 
Radicalization 
tunnel theory (n = 
5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of concern 
signs and signals (n 
= 15) 
 
Push and pull 
factors to 
extremism (n = 2) 
 
Risk and 
protective factors 
(n = 1) 
 
Pathways to VE 
theory (Swedish 
Security Police) 
(n = 2) 
 
 
 
List of concern 
signs and signals 
(n = 7) 
Table 3: Theories, models and checklists 
Another common model in use that resembles the push and pull factor model is the 
risk and protective factor model (Denmark, n = 2; Norway, n = 12; and Sweden, n = 1). The 
logic underpinning the model is that some factors make individuals become at risk of 
radicalization, while other factors make individuals resilient, and thus, function as protective 
against radicalization. Norwegian policies are especially fond of the model, and they use it 
with little variance. Nine of the 12 policies rely on a model consisting of 40 risk factors 
divided into five sections: personal factors, family-related factors, social factors, motivational 
factors and ideological and cultural factors. Examples of the factors categorized this way are 
impulsivity, poverty, bad home conditions, lack of knowledge, feeling discriminated against 
and being discontented with social and economic injustices. There are also 22 to 27 protective 
factors, which are divided the same way as the risk factors, but with the exception that no 
motivational protective factors are found in three of the CVE policies. 
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Checklists of signs, signals and indicators of radicalization are popular and widely 
used (Denmark, n = 15; Norway, n = 15; and Sweden, n = 7). These lists consist of a range 
(the mean value of the listed signs is 16) of observable or communicated behaviors, looks, 
attitudes and values that are presented as indicators of radicalization. Thus, they are to inform 
primarily frontline practitioners how to detect radicalization among the people they meet in 
daily work. The signs are to a high degree individualized, but some examples of signs among 
youth milieus and in specific communities are mentioned in three Danish policies and one 
Swedish policy. The signs on group and community level are, in most cases, the same signs 
used to detect individuals, but pluralized in order to fit the level of focus. 
There are different ways to categorize the individual indicators of concern. The 
Norwegian standard CVE policy categorizes them into four boxes, covering a total of 20 
indicators: (a) interest in, appearance and use of symbols; (b) families, friends and social 
networks; (c) activities; and (d) verbal opinions. The same homogeneity concerning the signs 
is not evident in Danish and Swedish CVE policies. In Denmark, six variants are used, and 
although only seven Swedish CVE policies use lists of concern signs, five variants are found 
in the material. Some of these signs in the checklists have a more direct connection with 
violent extremism and point to individuals’ actual involvement and actions in extremist 
organizations and milieus, while other are vague in their relation to radicalization: 
 
Intolerance for others’ point of view . . . Conspiracy theories . . . Sympathy for 
absolute solutions, such as abolishing democracy . . . Appeals to and search after 
extremist content on the internet . . . Changing looks, clothes . . . Quits school and 
leisure activities . . . Changing networks and social circle. (Baerum & Asker, 
2015, p. 7)  
 
Other signs found in the policies include “attempts to legitimize its opinions by pointing to 
deprivations in the society or the world” (Halmstad, 2017, p. 9), “is convinced that own 
opinions are the only just, try to argue and convince others” (Huddinge, 2016, p. 1) and “the 
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person begins to use an ideological and emotional language that criticizes and discriminates 
against others” (Haderslev, 2017, p. 4). The policies’ instructions for how a practitioner 
should understand these checklists contribute to rather than reduce the vagueness of the signs 
and their relation to violent extremism. Examples are statements such as “the list is not 
complete” (Baerum & Asker, 2015, p. 7), “a list cannot stand alone” (Rudersdal, n.d., p. 1), 
“the signs often are the same as we see at despair. Moreover, it can be other signs that can 
paint the picture of a youth who is in a radicalization process” (Hedensted, 2015, p. 4) and 
that there should be “a combination of signs of concern” (Drammen, 2015, p. 14) for a 
frontline practitioner to act, but without providing any information about the number or mix 
of combinations. As a consequence of the vague indicators, there seems to be a fundamental 
confusion concerning what the signs actually are signs of. Stavanger (n.d.) is one of the 
municipalities that suggests the signs “function as signs of circumstances that would make it 
possible for the person to be in danger of radicalization” (p. 11), underlining the general 
confusion whether the signs are indicators of someone who might be at risk of becoming 
radicalized, is undergoing a radicalization process or already is radicalized. More importantly, 
such a broad approach will transform certain groups to become “at risk and risky” (Heath-
Kelly, 2013, p. 394) based on “a mix of facts, norms, values and personal feelings” (van de 
Weert & Eijkman, 2018, p. 17), increasing the risk of stigmatization and violation of 
constitutional rights for those deemed vulnerable.  
To sum up, there are theories and models specific for each country and more 
interestingly, local translations of internationally known ones. Six Scandinavian 
municipalities uses the push and pull factor model, but no one the exact same version. 
Although only seven Swedish municipalities have a checklist with indicators of radicalization, 
five versions of checklists exist. The factors and indicators are continuously being 
reformulated and exchanged as they move between time and space: They live their own life in 
the hands of the “editors,” the officials writing the policies, and as Latour and Woolgar (1986) 
put it: “each of these people may act in many different ways, letting the token drop, or 
modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it” (p. 267). The 
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vague nature of the indicators and the fluent instructions for how to use them result in 
indicators that seemingly have little to with extremism, for example, focusing on young 
people’s non-criminal political or religious attitudes, their way of arguing for their cause, 
changes in their social relationships and clothing. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
This paper seeks to explain how local policies conceptualize radicalization by exploring the 
definitions, explanatory factors and theories, models and checklists utilized in 60 
Scandinavian municipal CVE policies. Wolman (1981) argued that to address a problem in 
public policy, the first step is to understand the problem. From that point of view, it might be 
concerning that the findings in this paper show that there are various understandings regarding 
some of the fundamental characteristics often associated with the idea of radicalization: its 
proposed processual nature, outcome(s) of the process, root causes, theories or models to 
explain it and what indicators should be used to detect radicalization (or the risk of it). In 
several cases, radicalization is portrayed as a mere outcome and not a process. Regarding the 
different types of outcomes of radicalization, the problem of distinguishing between cognitive 
outcomes of radicalization (e.g. extremist ideas) and radical thoughts is managed by applying 
editing strategies where the municipalities either neglect or downplay the problematic 
relationship. The problem, however, remains on a practical level: How is a teacher to know if 
a pupil is developing into a “good” radical or a “bad” radical? Instead of neglecting and 
avoiding, policymakers need to explicitly address this conflict and the overall variances in the 
understanding of radicalization by problematizing the idea. Otherwise, there is an increasing 
risk of CVE policies countering radical thoughts rather than extremism.  
There are at least two ways to understand why such considerable variance in 
translations of radicalization occurs on the local level. The first is the lack of scientific 
evidence concerning “how and why radicalization happens” (Hardy, 2018, p. 99); we know 
little about why people actually choose to engage in and commit violence in extremist groups. 
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This uncertainty simplifies the connotation and transformation of most forms of deviant ideas, 
behaviors and experiences, as well as social and cultural identities, into possible risk factors 
and indicators of radicalization. Therefore, more research is needed on which and how factors 
causally relate and contribute to radicalization processes. Otherwise, there is an obvious risk 
of labeling deviant individuals as future extremists on a vague and prejudiced basis.  
The second way is grounded in the neo-institutional understanding of what happens 
when organizations are put under institutional pressure to act in situations of uncertainty. 
Given the general absence of local mappings and reflections of how the problem of 
radicalization is manifested in the municipalities, the need for a CVE policy does not seem to 
derive from a rational problem-driven deliberation process, but as a response to the demands 
of the institutional context. The uncertainty about how to make sense of a problem that they 
have little experience of encountering drives the translation of legitimate and fashionable 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005) definitions, explanatory factors and theories, models and 
checklists for radicalization in the “emerging policy field” (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 337). 
However, as these abstract models then encounter local institutions and agency in the 
municipalities, the objects becomes locally edited. For instance, recall the origin and travel of 
the push and pull factor model (table 3), used by many Scandinavian municipalities. It derives 
from migration research (Schoorl, 2000), was dis-embedded from that context, translated to 
the field of counter extremism, edited to incorporate factors relevant to countering 
radicalization, repackaged into a coherent model, made fashionable by legitimate actors and is 
now being edited and re-edited as it is “littered around the social landscape” (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, p. 345).  
Few municipalities reflect upon whether radicalization is a problem at all in the 
municipality and if so, into what type of milieu and how this might affect the municipalities’ 
understanding of the issue. Radicalization is edited and stripped from its context in the 
analyzed policies and presented as a decontextualized, abstracted and stable idea that will “fit” 
everywhere. One of the main arguments for local authorities’ involvement in CVE work is 
that contextual adaption of measures in relation to the local manifestations of the problem is 
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more effective (Vermeulen, 2014; RAN, 2016a). The decontextualization of radicalization 
noticed in this paper serves as a stark contrast to this ambition and should raise some 
concerning questions for international, national and local CVE policymakers. Paying attention 
to the context in which radicalization happens is a major potential improvement that possibly 
can contribute to more relevant local descriptions of the problem and thus, more adequate 
practical work deployed to counter it. 
Despite the considerable variances in the translations of radicalization manifested in 
the findings, institutional elements constrain and direct attention to certain ways of 
understanding radicalization. The first is national belonging. As noted in table 1, 2 and 3, 
there are some notable differences between the Nordic countries in their translations of 
radicalization. This shows that the national context constrains and influences which type of 
definitions, explanatory factors and theories, models and checklists that are the focus. As the 
municipalities strive to be conceived of as legitimate actors, they adapt their translations in 
relation to its immediate spatial (Scott, 1995) and cultural (Strang & Meyer, 1993) 
relationships in the organizational field. Second, the social entity of the translators influences 
the translation and editing of radicalization (Strang & Meyer, 1993). As the perceived self-
identification (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, & Wedlin, 2005) of an organizational actor is 
formed by its belonging to certain social entities (e.g., municipalities), municipalities focus on 
certain explanatory factors rather than others. This becomes most evident when reviewing the 
focus placed on grievances in table 2. The puzzle is that neither national belonging nor the 
social entity is able to explain the micro-level variance in the translations of radicalization 
between municipalities in the same country. As mentioned, local experiences of radicalization 
seem to have limited influence on the translation process, indicating that instead, they are 
dependent on the local identity and agency of the editor. The identity, agency and preferences 
of the one(s) in charge of writing the policy highly influence “what cherries to pick” in the 
construction of the policy. As exploring this constrain goes beyond the methodological scope 
of this paper, institutional scholars and scholars interested in radicalization studies are 
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encouraged to further analyze such micro-level processes to understand why some cherries are 
chosen while others are neglected in the construction of CVE policies. 
What has been analyzed in this paper is how the idea of radicalization has been 
materialized, through translation processes, in municipal CVE policies. Countering extremism 
is a fairly new task for Scandinavian municipalities and most of the policies analyzed in this 
paper were crafted during 2015-2016 under intense institutional pressure from politics, media 
and the public (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017). Since then, many national- and 
international training initiatives have been undertaken in the Scandinavian countries. The 
professionalization of local level employees and institutionalization of the field of actors 
involved in CVE work have possibly contributed to streamlining conceptualizations of 
radicalization. In regard to this acknowledgement, the data analyzed in this paper only 
limitedly can portray the changes and development that the field has undergone during this 
period of time. Also, the findings only provide an indication of how radicalization is further 
translated, conceptualized and used in practical CVE work conducted by frontline 
practitioners. Hence, understanding how the idea of radicalization plays out in practice 
remains an ambitious, yet fundamentally important, empirical task for research in this field. 
Another interesting task for future research would be, in contrast to this paper, to compare 
more politically, culturally and geographically deviant cases to shed further light on the social 
institutions that shape national- and local CVE policies and their understandings of 
radicalization. 
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extremism. Retrieved from 
http://www.regeringen.se/49bb8c/contentassets/441d6f98b4e340d3a1a975d66c3e81f6
/han dlingsplan-for-att-varna-demokratin-mot-valdsbejakande-extremism-skr.-
20111244 
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Appendix 1: CVE policies included in the analysis  
Sweden  Norway  Denmark  
Stockholm Huddinge Drammen Skien Frederiksberg Ålborg 
Gothenburg Uppsala Ski Bergen Copenhagen Silkeborg 
Örebro Eskilstuna Ålesund Fjell, Asköj, 
Öygarden & 
Sund 
Esbjerg Randers 
Norrköping Malmö Horten Oslo Ringkoping-
Skjern 
Haderslev 
Karlstad Linköping Stavanger Kristiansand Herning Viborg 
Helsingborg Borås Moss Karmöy Helsingör Vejle 
Solna Gävle Baerum & 
Asker 
Kongsberg Odense Horsens 
Nacka Västerås Fredrikstad Larvik Kolding Hedensted 
Halmstad Sundsvall Trondheim Lillehammer Aarhus Frederikshavn 
Lund Kungsbacka Hamar Gjövik Holbaek Lyngby-
Taarbaek 
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